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1899 
FRAUD OR CONFUSION: A PILL FOR 
CHRONIC SECURITIES LITIGATION  
IN THE LIFE SCIENCES SECTOR 
Abstract: Publicly traded life science companies must navigate two overlapping 
regulatory agencies with distinct disclosure policies. The Food & Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) has a policy of under-disclosure to incentivize drug development 
while the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) encourages over-
disclosure to avoid securities fraud. The FDA’s far-reaching and complex regula-
tions, coupled with its acquiescence to confidentiality, obfuscates a life science 
company’s obligations under SEC regulation; as a result, life science companies 
are an attractive target for securities litigation. This Note explores the interplay 
between FDA and SEC regulations to pinpoint the source of the disproportionate-
ly high rate of securities litigation. It identifies two possible causes, one calling 
for drastic reforms and the other requiring a modest solution in comparison. It 
subsequently recommends the FDA release broad guidance on good disclosure 
practices in an attempt to reduce litigation for life science companies before more 
radical reforms are required. 
INTRODUCTION 
Publicly traded life science companies primarily operate in two regulatory 
domains, complying with both the FDA and the SEC.1 The FDA seeks to pro-
mote public health by ensuring the safety and efficacy of marketed drugs, while 
the SEC protects investors against securities fraud.2 Balancing these distinct in-
terests has created unique regulatory stressors that place life science companies 
in an increasingly vulnerable position.3 The crux of this risk is a life science 
company’s decision on what information, if any, it will disclose to investors.4 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Joseph G. Milner, Sunlight and Other Disinfectants: Disclosure Obligations Under the 
Federal Securities and Regulatory Regimes, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 141, 143 (2017) (describing the 
regulatory purpose of the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) and how they interact with life science companies). 
 2 See id. (pointing to the distinct regulatory purposes of the SEC and FDA). 
 3 See Katherine Cohen et al., Predictable Materiality: A Need for Common Criteria Governing 
the Disclosure of Clinical Trial Results by Publicly-Traded Pharmaceutical Companies, 29 J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 202 (2013) (investigating the difficulties that life science companies 
face when assessing materiality for SEC disclosures); Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, The Sitting 
Ducks of Securities Class Action Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation of 
Scientific Data, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 914 (2010) (analyzing the confusion surrounding materiality 
for life science companies); Milner, supra note 1, at 143 (assessing the competing disclosure issues in 
the life science sector generated by the separate regulatory purposes). 
 4 See Milner, supra note 1, at 143–45 (highlighting the importance of disclosure decisions that 
generate legal liability for life science companies). 
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The FDA puts new drugs through a rigorous approval process to ensure their 
safety and efficacy.5 The information generated from this process mostly re-
mains confidential due to statutory constrictions on FDA disclosure and deep-
rooted incentives for life science companies to protect their competitive ad-
vantage.6 Simultaneously, the SEC encourages life science companies to over-
disclose information related to the FDA approval process to avoid misleading 
investors and subsequent securities litigation.7 
Obfuscating the issue is the SEC’s disclosure triggermaterialitythat 
asks companies to assess the significance of a given fact from the perspective of 
a reasonable investor.8 Because the FDA must determine that a drug is safe and 
effective before it is sold to consumers, the FDA effectively dictates the market-
ability of a life science company’s product.9 As the FDA regulates the marketa-
bility of a drug, so too does it heavily influence the materiality of information 
produced.10 Life science companies are therefore subjected to disclosure re-
quirements from one regulatory agency that are triggered by the decisions of 
another.11 Where the FDA promulgates intricate regulations spanning decades, 
but offers no guidance on disclosure practices, life science companies must con-
stantly predict what information is significant enough to the FDA that it may be 
material, and require disclosure, under SEC regulation.12 
The confidentiality incentives and complex disclosure triggers created by 
the regulatory bodies have sparked a hotbed for litigation in the life science sec-
tor.13 In 2017 alone, eighty-eight securities lawsuits were filed against life sci-
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 916–23 (providing a full description of FDA pre- and post-
market approval regulation). 
 6 See Milner, supra note 1, at 144–45 (describing this information as competitive trade secrets 
protected under federal law). 
 7 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 924, 926–29 (highlighting the extensive disclosure re-
quirements and pressures placed on life science companies by securities regulation and investors). 
 8 See Milner, supra note 1, at 149 (explaining the materiality standard promulgated by the SEC 
that often prompts disclosure requirements). 
 9 See id. at 153 (pointing to the FDA’s authority to prohibit the marketing of a drug unless it has 
received approval). 
 10 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 925 (describing how the marketability of a drug, as influ-
enced by the FDA, is significant to investors and therefore affects materiality). 
 11 See id. (explaining how the FDA’s effect on marketability generates information that is materi-
al to a reasonable investor). 
 12 See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of 
R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 26 (2016) (estimating the average length of time for FDA ap-
proval of a sample of drugs to be eleven years and considering post-approval regulation that can span 
years). 
 13 See DAVID H. KISTENBROKER ET AL., DECHERT LLP, DECHERT SURVEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS AGAINST U.S. LIFE SCIENCES COMPANIES, at 6 (2018), https://
www.dechert.com/knowledge/publication/2018/2/dechert-survey—developments-in-securities-fraud-
class-actions-a.html [https://perma.cc/EV2A-Y3SW] (finding a disproportionately high number of 
securities class action suits against life science companies); see also Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 
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ence companies, representing twenty-one percent of all securities suits filed.14 
This number has been increasing, as life science companies faced 225% more 
securities suits in 2017 than 2012.15 
Part I of this Note provides the regulatory framework in which life science 
companies operate.16 Part II discusses the confusions surrounding the legal 
standard of materiality which acts as a trigger for disclosure requirements under 
the SEC.17 Finally, Part III argues that there are two possible causes of the secu-
rities litigation problem: intentional fraud or reckless fraud as a result of confu-
sion surrounding the SEC’s materiality standard in the context of FDA regula-
tion.18 It calls for comprehensive guidance from the FDA that clarifies best dis-
closure practices such that life science companies can accurately predict the ma-
teriality of events.19 
I. REGULATORY REALITY FOR LIFE SCIENCE COMPANIES 
This Part explores the various regulatory requirements placed on publicly 
traded life science companies and the subsequent safeguards for confidentiali-
ty.20 Section A outlines the FDA’s drug approval process, post-approval regula-
tion, and the incentives that attract life science companies.21 Section B explains 
the FDA’s statutory requirements to keep drug sponsor information confiden-
tial.22 Finally, Section C provides an overview of regulations promulgated by the 
SEC that is relevant to life science companies.23 
A. FDA Regulation of Drug Products 
An understanding of the extensive and costly FDA approval process is re-
quired to appreciate the disclosure tensions placed on life science companies.24 
Life science companies are subject to immense pre- and post-market regulations 
that span almost two decades.25 The huge cost of complying with these regula-
                                                                                                                           
915 (discussing the interaction between FDA and SEC regulations that generate heightened risk for 
life science companies). 
 14 See KISTENBROKER ET AL., supra note 13, at 5 (pointing out the disproportionately high num-
ber of securities suits for life science companies compared to their market share). 
 15 See id. (compiling lawsuit data from 2012 to 2017). 
 16 See infra notes 20–147 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 148–220 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 221–272 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 257–272 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 21–147 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 24–77 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 78–99 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 100–147 and accompanying text. 
 24 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 924 (explaining how the ongoing FDA-Sponsor communi-
cations and clinical trial data create the regulatory clash). 
 25 See DiMasi et al., supra note 12, at 31 (calculating the full cost of drug development and post-
approval monitoring to be $2.9 billion). 
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tions naturally generates trade secrets that offer a competitive advantage.26 Ac-
cordingly, the large research and development costs incentivize sponsors to keep 
any and all competitive advantages confidential.27 
1. Pre-Market Regulation 
The FDA derives its statutory authority to regulate drug products from the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA).28 To promote public 
health, the FDA requires companies prove the safety and efficacy of any drug 
before it is marketed to consumers.29 Highly regulated clinical investigations 
must be conducted by the appropriate personnel to prove a new product’s safety 
and efficacy for human use.30 
Research and development (R&D) of a new product to prove its safety and 
efficacy goes through three distinct steps: (1) pre-clinical testing, (2) clinical tri-
als, and (3) post-clinical steps.31 Prior to FDA involvement, companies initiate 
drug discovery programs to find chemical compounds with promising treatment 
potential.32 They then test those compounds on animal subjects in pre-clinical 
studies to confirm the initial findings of drug effectiveness.33 Although the FDA 
does not directly regulate pre-clinical investigations, companies design them 
with FDA standards in mind to raise the odds of subsequent approval for clinical 
trials.34 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Milner, supra note 1, at 144. “Trade secret” is a term of art that grants special protected status 
barring disclosure by federal agencies or actors. See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2018) (prohibiting the release 
of information that qualifies as a trade secret). 
 27 See Milner, supra note 1, at 144–45 (likening this information to business strategies that allow 
a company to maximize profit after making investments). 
 28 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2018) 
(providing the FDA regulatory authority to ensure the safety and efficacy of food, drugs, and cosmet-
ics); Allison Stoddart, Note, Missing After Mensing: A Remedy for Generic Drug Consumers, 53 B.C. 
L. REV. 1967, 1971–73 (explaining that the lengthy and expensive drug approval process heavily 
incentivizes drug companies to protect their investment through all means possible). 
 29 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 917 (showing Congress at the time was concerned with 
fraudulent marketing of ineffective drugs that may be detrimental to a person’s health). 
 30 See id. (pointing to the extensive and intricate clinical trials necessary to prove a drug’s safety 
and efficacy). 
 31 See id. (using the clinical trials as the reference point, indicating their significance in the ap-
proval process). 
 32 See id. (discussing research programs initiated by life science companies to identify marketable 
drugs). 
 33 See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 669–70 (4th ed. 2014) (indicating the 
significance of animal trials before any testing is conducted in human subjects). 
 34 See id. (showing how life science companies structure their decisions around FDA authority 
even when they do not regulate that activity). Pre-clinical studies should yield preliminary information 
on the drug’s efficacy, manufacturing constructs, and toxicity in animals. See id. at 670–71 (projecting 
success with important clinical trial goals). 
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A drug may then proceed to clinical trials in the absence of FDA objec-
tion.35 Clinical trials were traditionally broken down into distinct groups called 
Phase I, II, and III, but recent FDA guidance has blurred these distinctions.36 
Companies are encouraged to conduct an exploratory investigational new drug 
(IND) study, or Phase Zero Trial, to screen out compounds likely to fail in clini-
cal trials.37 Phase I then explores the side effects on humans at various doses so 
an effective Phase II study can be designed.38 Subsequent Phase II studies seek 
to produce preliminary data on the efficacy of a drug and identify any prominent 
short-term side effects.39 
Phase III studies are the crux of the FDA approval process and provide the 
backbone for a drug’s claim of safety and efficacy.40 These studies administer 
the drug at its intended doses to the population it seeks to treat.41 Companies 
conducting Phase III studies, with FDA consultation, establish key endpoints 
they hope the drug will achieve during the trials.42 Such endpoints provide a 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 917 (explaining how the FDA must take affirmative action 
to stop a company from proceeding with clinical trials). 
 36 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2019) (creating three phases of clinical investigations); see also HUTT 
ET AL., supra note 33, at 678 (pointing to the recent addition of Phase Zero clinical trials which has 
obfuscated traditional approval stage demarcations). The traditional three-phase structure for FDA 
approval has recently seen the addition of both Phase Zero and Phase IV trials, which may be re-
quired. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 33, at 678 (describing when the extra phases may be needed). 
 37 See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATORS, AND REVIEWERS: EXPLORATORY IND STUDIES, at 1 (2006), https://
www.fda.gov/files/Guidance-to-Industry-and-Reviewers—Exploratory-IND-Studies-%28PDF%29.
pdf [https://perma.cc/P944-GPVS] (naming Phase Zero trials “exploratory IND [(investigational new 
discovery)] studies” according to official FDA guidance). These initial studies do little to prove a 
drug’s safety and efficacy because they are not typically conducted with humans. See id. at 3 (alluding 
to the FDA’s preference for a smaller number of successful IND applications instead of a larger num-
ber of unfiltered applications). 
 38 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (describing the results and structure of Phase I clinical trials that 
allow Phase II trials to begin). Phase I studies should examine the metabolic and pharmacologic ac-
tions of the drug in the human body and any associated side effects. Id. Twenty to eighty subjects 
participate in Phase I trials. Id. 
 39 See id. § 312.21(b) (explaining that Phase II trials are more stringently controlled to produce 
stronger data of safety and efficacy). Results from Phase II trials may produce a dose/response curve 
and data on benefits to the general population derived from a few hundred subjects. Id. 
 40 See HUTT ET AL., supra note 33, at 681–82 (highlighting the importance of Phase III results in 
the FDA’s ultimate benefit-risk analysis). 
 41 See id. (providing efficacy data that will support a bid for FDA approval). The larger popula-
tion sample and longer duration provide more data on a drug’s risks and effectiveness, allowing the 
FDA to adequately weigh the risks and benefits of market approval. Id. 
 42 See ONCOLOGY CTR. OF EXCELLENCE ET AL., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLINICAL TRIAL 
ENDPOINTS FOR THE APPROVAL OF CANCER DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, at 
1–3 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/71195/download [https://perma.cc/P5LE-3HLM] (providing 
the regulatory authority for relying on endpoints to deduce the efficacy of a drug treating cancer). 
Clinical endpoints are physiological indicators, such as blood pressure, that are generally accepted in 
the medical field as having a relationship with primary outcomes such as survivability. See id. at 2 
(“[T]he FDA may grant approval based on an effect on a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely 
to predict clinical benefit.”). 
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glimpse into the marketability of a drug if it were to succeed in Phase III trials 
and receive full FDA approval for the desired indications.43 Data from a success-
ful Phase III trial should justify an assumption of safety and efficacy for a drug’s 
use in the general population.44 
Following successful clinical trials, a drug moves into the post-clinical stage 
in which the sponsor files a new drug application (NDA) for market approval.45 
The NDA should provide everything there is to know about the drug thus far, in-
cluding the events of the new drug approval process, the safety and efficacy data, 
manufacturing information, and proposed labeling.46 A team comprising various 
disciplines then determines if the drug meets FDA standards of safety, efficacy, 
and quality needed for market approval.47 The review team generates an opinion 
to either approve or deny the application that a senior FDA official takes into con-
sideration when making the ultimate determination of approval.48 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See id. at 3–4 (allowing the inference that a drug may be approved for marketing to specific 
endpoint populations, which can be measured to estimate profitability). 
 44 See HUTT ET AL., supra note 33, at 681–82 (comprising an essential component of the market-
ing application that allows the FDA to conduct a risk-benefit analysis). This information is also used 
to create adequate labeling pursuant to FDA requirements. See 21 C.F.R § 312.21(c) (highlighting the 
uses of Phase III data in FDA regulation). 
 45 Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 918. 
 46 See New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/New
DrugApplicationNDA/default.htm [https://perma.cc/37NW-4622] (providing a template for new drug 
applications (NDAs) and what information should be included). An NDA is the sole vehicle through 
which a company may commercialize a drug product. See id. (stating that every new drug since 1938 
has submitted an NDA before market approval). Applicants should include all preceding animal and 
human clinical trials so the FDA can effectively review the drug’s safety and efficacy. See id. (accom-
plishing this by using NDAs “to tell the drug’s whole story”). The FDA also reviews proposed label-
ing and manufacturing controls that must be approved before commercialization. Id. 
 47 See Review Team Responsibilities, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/About
FDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm161531.htm [https://perma.
cc/CND6-8Q5T] (describing the composition and function of the review team). Each review team 
consists of a project manager, medical officer, pharmacology/toxicology specialist, statistician, clini-
cal pharmacology/biopharmaceutics expert, and some combination of chemists, biologists, and micro-
biologists. See id. (explaining in detail the responsibilities of each review team member). 
 48 See Step 4: FDA Drug Review, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/
Approvals/Drugs/ucm405570.htm [https://perma.cc/U99N-AAZK] (highlighting that the review 
team’s expert recommendation is not dispositive, leaving room for counterintuitive results). The re-
view team has six to ten months to review an NDA as well as to inspect on-site manufacturing prac-
tices. See id. (describing how each member independently reviews the portion of the application with-
in their area of expertise and then compiles their review with others to create a general recommenda-
tion). 
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2. Post-Market Regulation 
Even after a drug is approved for marketing, the FDA must continue to en-
sure its safety and efficacy for the general population.49 Drug manufacturers are 
therefore subject to post-approval safety monitoring and reporting require-
ments.50 For example, a drug sponsor must report specified adverse drug events 
within fifteen days and submit quarterly reports of any other adverse events for 
three years following NDA approval.51 
The FDA may also condition NDA approval on a sponsor’s agreement to 
conduct post-approval testing, called Phase IV clinical trials.52 For drugs that 
have already received marketing approval, the FDA may require a company to 
conduct Phase IV studies if new information about a drug’s safety is discov-
ered.53 Further, companies must include progress reports for Phase IV studies in 
each of their annual NDA reports and provide specific reasons for any delay in 
post-approval trials.54 
If an approved drug appears to pose a safety threat or proves to be ineffec-
tive, the FDA may require a recall.55 The FDA provides for two avenues of re-
call: a voluntary recall or a recall requested by the FDA.56 Typically sponsors 
voluntarily recall a drug when new information poses serious questions about the 
drug’s safety.57 Companies thus must remain vigilant in their post-approval 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See HUTT ET AL., supra note 33, at 834–59 (outlining the FDA’s extensive post-approval regu-
lation that ensures ongoing safety and efficacy of a drug). 
 50 See id. (describing the broad post-approval regulations needed to ensure ongoing safety and 
efficacy). 
 51 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c) (requiring sponsors to report any “serious adverse drug experience” 
that happens when any one of the drug responses enumerated in § 314.80(a) occurs). A company need 
only submit annual reports of other adverse events more than three years after NDA approval. Id. 
§ 314.80(c)(2)(i). 
 52 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(A) (allowing the secretary to demand post-approval clinical trials as 
a condition for commercialization). Post-approval studies are typically focused on monitoring a drug’s 
safety as it is used in the general population. See id. § 355(o)(3)(B) (pointing to risk assessment as the 
primary purpose for post-approval studies). 
 53 See id. § 355(o)(3)(C) (making the presence of new safety information a necessity for demand-
ing Phase IV studies from already approved drugs). “New safety information” is defined as any in-
formation suggesting that the drug poses a serious risk or that the sponsor’s risk evaluation and miti-
gation strategies are ineffective. See id. § 355-1(b)(3) (allowing a wide range of sources for the new 
information). 
 54 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(vii) (enumerating status reports on post-approval studies as a 
requirement for annual NDA reports). The regulation asks that progress reports uniquely describe the 
post-marketing study, provide a study schedule for significant milestones, and list the current status of 
any post-marketing studies. See id. (providing specific guidelines for submissions requiring that the 
reasons for any delay provide a direct explanation for each change in the post-marketing study sched-
ule). 
 55 See id. § 7.40 (providing that recall is appropriate where a product threatens public health and 
well-being). 
 56 See id. § 7.40(b) (establishing the methods by which the FDA recalls products). 
 57 See id. (“A request by the Food and Drug Administration that a firm recall a product is reserved 
for urgent situations . . . .”); see also FDA 101: Product Recalls, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
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monitoring requirements and be willing to submit unfavorable reports to the 
FDA if such information is found.58 During recalls, the FDA supervises the 
company’s recall plan to make sure it is sufficiently implemented and effectively 
notifies the public about the product’s dangers.59 
3. Incentives and the Cost of Doing Business 
The extensive pre- and post-approval regulations create a large financial 
burden on a company.60 Achieving market approval takes an average of eleven 
years and creates $2.6 billion in R&D costs.61 With additional post-approval 
costs, the total average bill reaches a staggering $2.9 billion per new drug.62 
Intellectual property laws that grant patents lasting twenty years from the 
time of filing are the primary mechanism for protecting a life science company’s 
investment in developing a new drug.63 A patented drug still cannot generate 
revenue from sales of the drug until the FDA approves it for marketing.64 To 
combat this issue, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) offers Patent 
Term Extensions (PTE) for inventions that required extensive regulatory review 
                                                                                                                           
www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm049070.htm [https://perma.cc/VCD4-WVBG] 
(detailing the normal recall process). New information about a drug’s safety can be discovered in a 
myriad of ways including sponsor divulgence, FDA inspection, health reports, or discussions with the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. See FDA 101: Product Recalls, supra (providing poten-
tial sources of new safety information). If new safety information changes the FDA’s cost-benefit 
analysis of a drug such that it poses a serious hazard, it will alert the public. See id. (disseminating this 
information through press conferences, public press releases, and updates to the FDA’s website). 
 58 See FDA 101: Product Recalls, supra note 57 (indicating the extensive post-approval require-
ments levied on life science companies). 
 59 See FDA’s Role in Drug Recalls, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DrugSafety/DrugRecalls/ucm612550.htm [https://perma.cc/U7S2-4VTW] (stating the FDA’s com-
mitment to enforce drug recalls and its role in the process). The FDA classifies recalls in three groups 
based on the threat posed. Id. Additionally, the FDA updates recalls through weekly enforcement 
reports. See id. (allowing investors to see the status of various drug recalls). If a recall strategy is 
deemed ineffective, the FDA will impose further requirements to ensure public safety. Id. 
 60 See DiMasi et al., supra note 12, at 31 (analyzing a random sample of 106 new drugs re-
searched by ten international pharmaceutical companies). 
 61 See id. (considering the costs of both failed new drugs and those granted market approval). The 
investigators estimated the direct research cost per new drug as well as the added costs of having 
money tied up in a research project for over a decade. See id. at 24 (measuring capitalized investment 
costs with a model that balances the cost of equity and debt to pharmaceutical companies). The $2.6 
billion represents the combined cost for direct investment and lost opportunity due to private research. 
See id. at 24, 31 (accounting for vacillations in market health and increased inflation). 
 62 See id. at 26, 31 (incorporating costs associated with required postmarking research, reporting, 
and monitoring requirements). 
 63 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2018) (providing twenty-year patents starting from the date filed with 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office). The holder of a patent on a drug has the right to exclude others 
from manufacturing, marketing, using, and selling that drug in the United States for the term of the 
patent. Id. 
 64 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.1 (requiring FDA approval before a drug can be marketed in the United 
States). 
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before marketing.65 Nonetheless, the maximum PTE is a meager five years, a far 
cry from a decade or more lost in regulatory limbo.66 The length of the FDA’s 
approval process therefore directly reduces a company’s ability to capitalize on 
its investment, creating temporal pressures to achieve approval as fast as possi-
ble.67 
To supplement drug patents, the FDA offers various incentives to encour-
age investments in innovative new drugs.68 Certain drugs are granted exclusive 
marketing rights that statutorily preclude the FDA from approving other similar 
drugs.69 For instance, the FDA provides seven years of market exclusivity to 
Orphan Drugs that target conditions afflicting fewer than 200,000 people in the 
United States.70 The FDA also grants five-year market exclusivity to new chemi-
cals and three-year exclusivity when an NDA submits a new clinical investiga-
tion deemed essential to its approval.71 FDA-granted market exclusivity begins 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (allowing Patent Term Extensions (PTE) if (1) the patent has not expired; 
(2) the patent has not been extended before; (3) a timely application has been filed; (4) the invention 
was subjected to a “regulatory review period;” and (5) the marketing approval is novel, except for 
technology primarily using recombinant DNA methods). For new drugs, the “regulatory review peri-
od” is calculated as the sum of the time taken for new drug trials and application approval to be 
achieved. See id. § 156(g)(1)(B) (providing a formula for calculating the regulatory review period); 
Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions on Patent Term Restoration Program, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/cder-small-business-industry-assistance-sbia/small-
business-assistance-frequently-asked-questions-patent-term-restoration-program [https://perma.cc/
V45P-RCCE] (explaining that the regulatory review period is broken into two periods, the testing 
phase and approval phase). Further minimizing the benefits of a PTE, active ingredients in a drug 
constitute a “product” under the statute which may limit a patent holder’s ability to extend a patent 
that uses an already extended active ingredient patent. See Scott Whittaker & Anthony Walker, Phar-
maceutical Patent Term Extension: An Overview, ALACRITA, https://www.alacrita.com/whitepapers/
pharmaceutical-patent-term-extension-an-overview [https://perma.cc/GX7H-RX8Y] (acknowledging 
that PTEs are limited to the patented active ingredient); Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked 
Questions on Patent Term Restoration Program, supra (clarifying what constitutes an active ingredi-
ent). 
 66 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A). 
 67 See id. § 154(a)(2) (providing twenty-year patents); see also Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 
924 (describing market pressure on FDA companies to reach approval). 
 68 See Milner, supra note 1, at 185 (pointing to the FDA’s promise of confidentiality and grant of 
exclusive marketing for certain drugs). 
 69 See CDER SMALL BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY ASSISTANCE, FDA/CDER SBIA CHRONICLES: 
PATENTS AND EXCLUSIVITY, at 2 (2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapproval
process/smallbusinessassistance/ucm447307.pdf [https://perma.cc/84VZ-G52U] (describing the ex-
clusivity granted to various drug applications). The FDCA, as amended, creates exclusivity in four 
different scenarios because the FDA is statutorily barred from approving competing drugs. See id. 
(distilling the statutory requirements for each situation). 
 70 See id. (describing Orphan Drug status as “[g]ranted to drugs designated and approved to treat 
diseases or conditions affecting fewer than 200,000 in the U.S. (or more than 200,000 and no hope of 
recovering costs)”). 
 71 See id. (outlining the statutory requirements for marketing exclusivity). New chemicals are 
defined as drugs that contain a chemical moiety not yet granted approval by the FDA. Id. 
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at the time of approval, thereby failing to provide further protection unless a 
drug’s patent life is nearly over.72 
At the core of an applicant’s willingness to invest in FDA regulated R&D is 
the FDA’s promise of confidentiality.73 Due to its interpretation of federal stat-
utes restricting disclosures from federal agencies, the FDA has generally held 
sponsor information as confidential and refused to release it to the public.74 Be-
cause the FDA expects constant communication with a company regarding its 
application and clinical trial progress, it is privy to vast amounts of sensitive in-
formation.75 These communications often contain valuable information produced 
during the application process such as safety and efficacy data, intellectual prop-
erty, manufacturing practices, and more.76 Without the confidentiality require-
ment, information produced from multi-billion dollar investments could be dis-
closed to the public and subsequently utilized by competitors.77 
B. Confidentiality of FDA Correspondence and Data 
Two statutes, the Trade Secrets Act and FDCA § 301(j), work in conjunc-
tion to create the FDA’s requirement of confidentiality.78 Together, these laws 
restrict the FDA’s ability to disclose any sponsor information received through 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See id. (explaining the time frames for market exclusivity for a variety of drugs). 
 73 See Milner, supra note 1, at 144 (pointing to the FDA’s promise of confidentiality as an assur-
ance to life science companies). Companies investing billions into research and development (R&D) 
are comforted by the fact that new discoveries will remain private between them and the FDA. Id. 
 74 See id. at 158–59 (“This interpretation reflects FDA’s belief that sponsor-provided clinical data 
is confidential information.”). The FDA has also previously defined trade secret as any information 
that provides a competitive advantage. See 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,613, 44,631 (Dec. 24, 1974) (de-
termining that a trade secret, for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), is any in-
formation that provides a competitive advantage). This interpretation, according to the FDA, was 
consistent with Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts, as well as the Supreme Court’s interpretation. 
See id. at 44,612 (citing Supreme Court dicta that the Restatement definition used by the FDA is 
“widely relied-upon” (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bloron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974)). 
 75 See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RE-
SEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN IND 
SPONSORS AND FDA DURING DRUG DEVELOPMENT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND REVIEW STAFF, 
at 3 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/Best-Practices-for-Communication-Between-
IND-Sponsors-and-FDA-During-Drug-Development.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X4D-H72R] (outlining 
the general principle of communication between the FDA and drug sponsor). The FDA should com-
municate about any scientific, medical, and procedural issues that emerge during the review process. 
See id. at 5 (accepting communications over various mediums). Simultaneously sponsors are expected 
to seek advice from the FDA where they are confused or unsure about their drug development. See id. 
(explaining the general responsibilities of both the FDA and drug sponsors during drug development). 
 76 See id. at 5 (indicating that correspondence may contain clinical data, clinical trial design, fi-
nancial information, operational choices, and more). 
 77 See Milner, supra note 1, at 185 (showing how disclosure could lead to huge economic losses 
overseas). 
 78 See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (restricting federal agencies from releasing trade secrets); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 331(j) (prohibiting the FDA from releasing any information protected as a trade secret under the 
Trade Secrets Act). 
2020] Securities Litigation in the Life Sciences Sector 1909 
the drug application process.79 The FDA is permitted to release certain confiden-
tial information in specific conditions pursuant to two other federal laws.80 
Nonetheless, these exceptions ultimately maintain the prohibition on FDA dis-
closure of a drug sponsor’s trade secrets.81 
1. Statutory Requirements of FDA Confidentiality 
The FDA has interpreted the Trade Secrets Act and § 301(j) of the FDCA to 
explicitly prohibit the release of certain information produced during the drug 
application process.82 The language of the Trade Secrets Act prohibits a federal 
agency from disclosing a company’s trade secrets, processes, operations, or con-
fidential statistical data unless authorized by law.83 This does not create an abso-
lute bar, however, as agencies may disclose trade secrets permitted by a separate 
statute.84 The FDA’s statutory authority, the FDCA, also explicitly restricts the 
release of trade secrets under § 301(j).85 According to § 301(j), the agency may 
not reveal any trade secrets entitled to protection which the FDA acquired in the 
course of its regulation.86 
Neither statute offers a definition of trade secret, but the FDA has imple-
mented a broad interpretation of the term.87 Historically, during the drug approv-
al process, the FDA has refused to release any information that offers the com-
pany a competitive advantage.88 Clinical trial results clearly offer a competitive 
advantage, and the FDA has accordingly refused to disclose safety and efficacy 
data.89 The FDA similarly protects correspondence with drug sponsors during 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Milner, supra note 1, at 157 (describing how the FDA has interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 301(j) to 
bar the release of sponsor information). 
 80 See id. (referencing FOIA and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)). 
 81 See id. at 161 (pointing to exceptions in FOIA and FACA for information protected as trade 
secrets). 
 82 See Public Information, 37 Fed. Reg. 9128, 9129 (proposed May 5, 1972) (to be codified in 
scattered pts. of 21 C.F.R.) (explaining the statutory FDA requirements of confidentiality and the 
FDA’s interpretations of such statutes); see also Milner, supra note 1, at 157 (discussing the FDA’s 
interpretation of its statutory authority to release drug sponsor information). 
 83 See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (applying to information received by federal agencies during their regula-
tory operations). 
 84 See id. (prohibiting disclosures “to any extent not authorized by law”); see also Milner, supra 
note 1, at 158 (authorizing disclosure where another statute permits). 
 85 See 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (restricting the disclosure of “trade secrets” obtained through an exten-
sive but enumerated number of regulatory provisions). 
 86 See id. (applying to any trade secrets protected under the Trade Secrets Act); see also Public 
Information, 37 Fed. Reg. at 9129 (describing the FDA commissioner’s interpretation of “trade se-
crets” as it relates to § 301(j)). 
 87 See Milner, supra note 1, at 158 (exploring the FDA’s refusal to release and sponsor submitted 
information because it may contain trade secrets). 
 88 See 39 Fed. Reg. at 44,613, 44,631 (stating the FDA’s refusal to disclose trade secrets that offer 
a current or future competitive advantage, as determined by the agency). 
 89 See Milner, supra note 1, at 159 (pointing to the longstanding FDA practice of confidentiality 
regarding safety and efficacy data). 
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the approval process, which highlights the FDA’s understanding that extensive 
sponsor communications often contain commercial secrets that offer a competi-
tive advantage.90 
2. Statutory Exceptions Allowing Disclosure 
Though the FDA offers broad confidentiality to sponsors, two federal ex-
ceptions allow disclosure under narrow circumstances.91 The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA) allows the public to request certain information from federal 
agencies such as internal policies, manuals, and records.92 FOIA has allowed the 
public to obtain abandoned NDAs and protocols for post-market approval clini-
cal studies.93 Not all information must be released, however, and FOIA creates 
an exemption for trade secrets and confidential commercial information.94 The 
FDA has functionally interpreted FOIA as exempting any information that cre-
ates a competitive advantage or is ordinarily kept confidential in the industry.95 
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requires advisory committee 
meeting materials be made public.96 In compliance with FACA, the FDA gener-
ally posts background material for advisory meetings at least two days before the 
meeting and all meeting minutes within thirty days after.97 The FDA has stated it 
will redact any FOIA-exempt information from meeting materials disclosed in 
accordance with FACA.98 With this interpretation, FACA and FOIA do not di-
                                                                                                                           
 90 See id. (alluding to the FDA’s preference against disclosure of confidential sponsor information 
because it would discourage cooperation and disclosure with the FDA). 
 91 See id. at 160 (pointing to FOIA and FACA). 
 92 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2018) (outlining the types of files that federal agencies must make 
public). 
 93 See Peter Lurie & Allison Zieve, Sometimes the Silence Can Be Like the Thunder: Access to 
Pharmaceutical Data at the FDA, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2006, at 85, 94–96 (describing 
when public requests for information have been successful in requesting information from the FDA). 
 94 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (exempting any “trade secrets and commercial or financial infor-
mation obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”). 
 95 See 39 Fed. Reg. at 44,631 (stating the FDA’s position that it will not disclose information that 
provides a competitive advantage to a sponsor). 
 96 See 5 U.S.C. app. II § 10(b) (2018) (requiring transcripts or material from advisory committee 
meetings to be posted publicly in one location). 
 97 See Common Questions and Answers About FDA Advisory Committee Meetings, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/AboutAdvisoryCommittees/ucm408555.
htm [https://perma.cc/EDQ9-7YAT] (detailing the FDA’s compliance policies for FACA). The FDA 
uses advisory committees to provide third-party assessments of new drug applications that culminate 
in an independent recommendation for approval or disapproval of said application. See Human Drug 
Advisory Committees, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/
CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/default.htm [https://perma.cc/VKR8-K7ZR] (providing a brief 
description of an advisory committee’s role). The advisory committee’s recommendation is nonbind-
ing, although the FDA usually follows it. Id. 
 98 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEET-
INGS—PREPARATION AND PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION GIVEN TO ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE MEMBERS, at 10–11 (2008), https://www.fda.gov/media/75436/download [https://perma.cc/LP36-
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minish the FDA mandate to keep trade secrets and other confidential information 
private.99 
C. SEC Disclosure Requirements 
Publicly traded life science companies face a peculiar challenge under SEC 
regulations that may require disclosure of confidential FDA trade secrets.100 The 
volatility of the life science sector creates a heightened pressure to release in-
formation on a company’s FDA approval progress.101 In doing so, life science 
companies must be wary of both periodic disclosure requirements and investor 
communication rules.102 Sponsors must identify what information is material to 
investors and be sure not to make misleading statements of either fact or opinion 
regarding that material information.103 New amendments offer a safe harbor for 
forward-looking statements, but they do not always protect FDA-related disclo-
sures.104 
                                                                                                                           
7YD7] (providing examples of information typically protected under FOIA including manufacturing 
processes, clinical data, and non-labeled product information). 
 99 See Milner, supra note 1, at 161 (explaining how the FDA refuses to disclose trade secrets 
under FOIA and FACA). 
 100 See Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 231 (providing an example where securities regulation may 
require disclosure where the FDA does not); see also Andrew J. Ceresney et al., INSIGHT: The 
SEC/FDA Nexus: Best Practices for Publicly Traded Life Science Companies, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 
19, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/insight-the-sec-fda-nexus-best-practices-for-
publicly-traded-life-sciences-companies [https://perma.cc/A9RJ-KU87] (“[D]isclosure may be re-
quired . . . where a company has incomplete information. A life sciences company may, for example, 
be uncertain about the status of the FDA’s regulatory review, have partial results from a pivotal clini-
cal trial, or have reports of serious adverse events in the absence of confirmatory evidence.”). As Co-
hen describes, where pharmaceutical companies conduct extensive research on the economic viability 
of a drug, the SEC may require disclosure if the information is material to investors while the FDA 
remains indifferent. See Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 231. 
 101 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 923–24 (describing the pressure levied on life science com-
panies by hungry investors); see also Richard E. Baltz, Biotech Cos. Face Pressure to Disclose, LAW360 
(May 9, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/793630/biotech-cos-face-pressure-to-disclose [https://
perma.cc/2P9L-89T9]. Baltz writes: 
Investors demand information about clinical trials and regulatory developments . . . . 
[T]he clinical stage company is valued by the market based on the perceived future po-
tential of its product candidates. In this environment, investors do not perceive “no 
news” as “good news,” and silence can be reflected in a volatile stock price. 
Baltz, supra. 
 102 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 926–29 (exploring the various disclosure requirements 
placed on life science companies by the SEC). 
 103 See id. at 929 (pointing to the difficulty in assessing materiality when the FDA and SEC do 
not maintain uniform standards); see also Ceresney et al., supra note 100 (“[A] company’s financial 
well-being is dependent on one developmental product, in which case even relatively routine regulato-
ry developments may be deemed ‘material’ and require disclosure.”). 
 104 See Milner, supra note 1, at 152–53 (explaining that the safe harbors of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) do not apply to hard clinical trial data, SEC enforcement 
actions, or statements surrounding an Initial Public Offering (IPO)). 
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1. The Demand to Satiate Investors During FDA Approval Process 
Investing in the life science sector is extremely risky due to the high failure 
rate for new drug applications and high R&D expenses.105 Life science compa-
nies simultaneously offer a high return on investment if they strike gold with the 
next breakthrough drug.106 Trying to stay ahead of the volatile market, investors 
apply constant pressure for updates on a company’s drug approval status.107 
Companies may disclose this information in periodic reports required by the 
SEC or volunteer it on an ad hoc basis.108 
Deciding what information to disclose, and how to frame disclosure for in-
vestors, offers an incredible challenge.109 While pursuing FDA approval, there 
are countless setbacks, milestones, ambiguous clinical results, and seemingly 
insignificant communications that could affect the ultimate marketability of the 
drug.110 
2. Periodic Disclosure Requirements 
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 estab-
lish periodic reporting requirements for companies that sell shares on the open 
market.111 Companies entering the securities market through an initial public 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See DiMasi et al., supra note 12, at 20, 31 (estimating full R&D costs at $2.9 billion and elu-
cidating the countless drugs that fail to achieve FDA approval). 
 106 See Milner, supra note 1, at 145–46 (describing the high reward market in which life science 
companies operate); see also Celgene Corp., Annual Report 40 (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2018) (report-
ing $9.69 billion in net sales for Celgene’s FDA approved drug Revlimid). 
 107 See Milner, supra note 1, at 145–46 (discussing the pressure that the volatile life science in-
vestment market places on life science companies). The market is accordingly quick to react to any 
adverse news about a company’s prospects for drug approval. See Ceresney et al., supra note 100 
(explaining how a company’s disclosure of efficacy data caused its stock price to fall sixty percent in 
one day); Alex Keown, Akcea Therapeutics Stunned by FDA Rejection of FCS Treatment Waylivra, 
Shares Plunge, BIOSPACE (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.biospace.com/article/akcea-therapeutics-
stunned-by-fda-rejection-of-fcs-treatment-waylivra-shares-plunge/ [https://perma.cc/9J8W-7ZET] 
(reporting how the FDA’s denial of a drug application caused a company’s stock to fall by twenty-
eight percent). 
 108 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 926 (describing the methods by which companies may 
disclose information to investors). 
 109 See id. at 924 (pointing to the disclosure pressures placed on FDA-regulated companies 
throughout the drug approval process). 
 110 See id. (alluding to the stringent FDA regulations that create complex hurdles during the ap-
proval process); Ceresney et al., supra note 100 (pointing to nuanced scenarios where investors pres-
sure a life science company to issue a statement, but the company is not fully equipped to accurately 
describe their regulatory status). 
 111 See 15 U.S.C. § 77a–77aa (2018) (requiring companies planning to offer securities on a public 
exchange to file a registration that discloses material information); id. § 78a–78pp (granting the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) its authority to regulate public markets); see also Elisabeth 
Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 329–31 (1988) (exploring the history of securities 
regulation in the United States). 
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offering (IPO) must register with the SEC through a Form S-1.112 This filing de-
scribes in narrative form the nature of the registrant’s business, risks the business 
will face, and the business’ financial condition.113 After a company is registered 
on the exchange, it must submit templated periodic reports to update inves-
tors.114 Companies must submit annual reports through Form 10-K, quarterly 
reports through Form 10-Q, and reports of other current events through Form 8-
K.115 
All of the forms must comply with Regulation S-K that establishes what in-
formation should be submitted.116 Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires compa-
nies to submit management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) of their fiscal 
standing and operating results.117 In their MD&As, companies explain any 
changes to their financial and operational condition.118 Companies also provide 
projections for financial and operational targets and risks associated with those 
projections.119 This requirement is particularly important for life science compa-
nies whose financial and operational condition is so closely tied to FDA approv-
al.120 These forward-looking projections are typically protected under the safe 
harbor amendments.121 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2019) (establishing the requirements for registration to the securities 
exchange). 
 113 See Form S-1, at 4–5 (2019), U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
files/forms-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WXD-P72K] (providing a template for IPO submissions to the 
SEC). 
 114 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (allowing the SEC to promulgate requirements of periodic report-
ing). 
 115 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11; id. § 249.308a; id. § 249.310. Companies use Form 8-K when a 
material event, based on the facts and circumstances, occurs in-between periodic reports. See Div. of 
Corp. Fin., Current Report on Form 8-K: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N (Nov. 23, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/form8kfaq.htm [https://perma.
cc/W2VE-4Y98] (describing the ad hoc analysis needed to determine materiality). 
 116 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (necessitating management’s discussion and analyses for virtually all 
SEC filings required by the Exchange Act). 
 117 See id. § 229.303 (enumerating information to be submitted and further requiring issuers of 
stock to include any information they believe is relevant to understanding the company’s financials 
and operations). 
 118 See id. § 229.303(a) (including any changes that materially affected the amount of income, 
favorable or unfavorable impact on sales, and more). These requirements will naturally lead to life 
science companies including updates on FDA approval in their periodic filings because FDA approval 
has such a large economic impact on the company. See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 917 (explain-
ing how companies must receive FDA approval before marketing their drugs). 
 119 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (requiring the inclusion of risk to better inform investors). 
 120 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 924, 927 (discussing how financial operations of life sci-
ence companies are dictated by the FDA approval process). 
 121 See Milner, supra note 1, at 148 (pointing out that projections, by their nature, are forward- 
looking statements). The PSLRA creates safe harbors that protect companies against liability for for-
ward looking statements. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (protecting both oral and written statements). 
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3. Rule 10b-5, the Law of Not Misleading 
The SEC disclosure requirements are enforced through Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.122 Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to deceive 
investors in connection with purchases or sales of stocks traded on the ex-
change.123 Under the authority of Section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-
5 to combat companies that would defraud investors.124 Pursuant to Rule 10b-5, 
companies may not release any untrue statement of material fact or fail to release 
a material fact necessary to make other statements not misleading.125 
The U.S. Supreme Court has created a right of action for investors implied 
from the text and purpose of Section 10(b).126 To succeed with this cause of ac-
tion, plaintiffs must prove: (1) misrepresentation or omission of a material fact; 
(2) scienter; (3) connection to the buying or selling of a security; (4) reliance on 
the material misstatement or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) causation be-
tween the reliance and economic loss.127 
Proving scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA) places a heavy burden on plaintiffs, as they must plead with particular-
ity the facts giving rise to both the fraudulent statements and requisite state of 
mind for each statement made.128 Unanimous circuit decisions lessen this bur-
den, however, by allowing a recklessness standard where plaintiffs need only 
show that an inference of scienter is at least as compelling as the inference of 
nonfraudulent intent.129 
Although courts have found that Rule 10b-5 prohibits the omission of a ma-
terial fact, that is only true when the company has a duty to disclose that infor-
mation.130 A company only has a statutory duty to disclose information required 
                                                                                                                           
 122 15 U.S.C. § 78j; see Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 217 (describing Rule 10b as the primary 
enforcement tool because a private right of action has been imported). 
 123 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (counteracting companies that defraud investors). 
 124 Id.; see Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 148 (recognizing Rule 10b-5 as the source for private 
enforcement actions against securities fraud). 
 125 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (omitting a definition of materiality). 
 126 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318 (2007). 
 127 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (laying out the six required 
elements for a Rule 10b-5 cause of action). 
 128 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (heightening the scienter pleading requirements for private securi-
ties claims). 
 129 See Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 314 (requiring only that evidence weighing for recklessness be 
equal to or greater than evidence weighing against it). See generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, 
What Constitutes Recklessness Sufficient to Show Necessary Element of Scienter in Civil Action for 
Damages Under 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCS § 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5 of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission?, 49 A.L.R. FED. 392 (1980) (reviewing the decisions that al-
lowed 10b-5 complaints in all circuits to proceed by showing recklessness). 
 130 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44–45 (2011) (clarifying that Rule 
10b-5 only creates an affirmative duty to disclose material facts where it is necessary to ensure that 
another material fact is not misleading). This leaves companies in control of what information they 
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in the periodic reports.131 Accordingly, a company may choose not to disclose a 
material fact unless it is needed to make a periodic report or other statement not 
misleading.132 
4. Liability for Misleading or Untrue Statements of Opinion 
In 2015, in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Indus-
try Pension Fund, the Supreme Court considered the viability of a securities ac-
tion claiming a company misled investors with false opinions.133 At issue was 
Omnicare’s registration statement filed publicly with the SEC regarding its 
IPO.134 In the filing, Omnicare issued two statements establishing its belief that 
it was in full compliance with both state and federal law.135 After Omnicare as-
serted these statements, the federal government brought enforcement actions 
against Omnicare for a scheme of accepting drug manufacturer rebates in viola-
tion of anti-kickback laws.136 Investors subsequently filed a securities action ac-
cusing Omnicare of misleading its investors by providing opinions that the com-
pany could not have believed were true.137 
In its opinion, the Court pointed to the language of the Securities Act of 
1933 that only creates a right of action for untrue statements of fact.138 Nonethe-
less, statements of opinion constitute actionable statements of fact in three dis-
                                                                                                                           
disseminate to their investors. See id. (qualifying that this holds true only in the absence of some other 
duty to disclose the information). 
 131 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 147 (explaining that the Securities Act of 1933 and Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 only create a duty to disclose information required in periodic reports); 
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a–11 (outlining the Form 8-K requirements); id. § 249.308a (establishing 
Form 10-Q requirements); id. § 249.310 (creating Form 10-K requirements). 
 132 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (“Silence, absent a duty to disclose, 
is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”). 
 133 See 575 U.S. 175, 175 (2015) (analyzing whether a cause of action exists for misleading mate-
rial opinions). Plaintiffs sued under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, which contains the same 
enforcement language as Rule 10b-5. See id. at 176 (precluding companies from making untrue state-
ments of material fact or omitting statements of material fact necessary to make other statements not 
misleading). 
 134 See id. at 178 (pointing to investors as the target audience for such a filing). 
 135 See id. at 180–82 (noting the use of “we believe” to indicate a statement of opinion as opposed 
to a statement of fact). These statements were accompanied by cautionary language warning of in-
creased federal enforcement actions for similarly situated companies and that their interpretation of com-
pliance is subject to alternative opinions. See id. at 180–81 (attempting to fall within the PSLRA safe 
harbor provision bespeaks caution doctrine). 
 136 See id. at 183 (making it clear that Omnicare’s opinions were incorrect). 
 137 See id. at 186 (highlighting internal communications that showed Omnicare officers did not 
have reasonable grounds to believe that their actions complied with anti-kickback laws). The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district decision to grant Omnicare’s motion to dismiss, finding 
an opinion that turns out to be untrue can constitute a false statement of fact. See id. at 182. 
 138 See id. at 182–84 (stating that “facts” and “opinions” are different by definition and Congress 
acted purposefully when using the word fact). 
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tinct avenues outlined by the Court.139 First, material misrepresentations of opin-
ion create liability if the opinion is false and the issuer knows such to be false.140 
Second, liability may exist where a statement of opinion is embedded with un-
derlying statements of fact that are materially false or misleading.141 Lastly, the 
Court held that omission of a material fact necessary to make a statement of 
opinion not misleading to a reasonable investor may give rise to liability.142 
5. PSLRA Safe Harbor Provisions for Forward-Looking Statements 
Recognizing the liability created by projection requirements in Regulation 
S-K and fraud protections in Rule 10b-5, Congress created safe-harbor provi-
sions in the PSLRA for three scenarios: (1) forward-looking statements coupled 
with specifically tailored cautionary language; (2) immaterial forward-looking 
statements; and (3) forward-looking statements made without actual knowledge 
of falsity or its misleading nature.143 At first glance, the PSLRA safe harbor ap-
pears to provide substantial protection for life science companies, but it is se-
verely limited in a few key ways.144 Most important for life science companies, 
hard data falls outside the definition of a “forward-looking statement” that the 
safe harbor protects; therefore, the clinical data underlying projections may be 
the subject of litigation.145 The safe harbor provisions also only apply to private 
litigation, leaving forward-looking statements open to an SEC enforcement ac-
                                                                                                                           
 139 See id. at 183–87 (outlining three theories of liability for materially misleading statements of 
opinion). 
 140 See id. at 183–84 (alluding to the falsity of expressed opinion not actually held in fact). 
 141 See id. at 185–86 (contemplating scenarios where an issuer of opinion explains or supports 
their stance with facts). 
 142 See id. at 189–90 (conceding that issuers need not release all facts cutting against statements 
of opinion because reasonable investors are aware that uncertainty exists in such opinions). 
 143 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (providing safe harbors for oral and written forward-looking state-
ments); id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (explaining sufficient cautionary language as “meaningful . . . [in] iden-
tifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-
looking statement”); id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(ii) (memorializing the obvious conclusion that a Rule 10b-5 
action fails if statements made are immaterial). “Boilerplate warnings” do not qualify for the safe harbor 
according to the PSLRA House Conference Report. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 43 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
The protections offered by the PSLRA surpass the judge-made “bespeaks caution doctrine” that 
makes statements not misleading as a matter of law if reasonable minds could agree in their interpreta-
tions of the statements. See Levi v. Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d 784, 798 (9th Cir. 2017) (analyz-
ing the doctrine in the context of a Rule 10b-5 action against a life science company). 
 144 See Milner, supra note 1, at 152 (describing the limitations of the safe harbor provisions). 
 145 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1) (defining forward-looking statements to include projections, plans 
and objectives, statements of future performance, and assumptions); see also Milner, supra note 1, at 
152 (pointing out that clinical data does not change and is factual, thus not qualifying as forward-
looking). 
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tion.146 Lastly, the safe harbor does not apply to statements made regarding an 
IPO.147 
II. MATERIALITY AND DISCLOSURE THROUGH AN FDA LENS 
Actions brought pursuant to securities regulation often hinge on the materi-
ality of a statement or omission, yet neither the SEC nor the FDA provide any 
definition for what constitutes “materiality.”148 The FDA’s regulation of market-
ing for life science companies creates a unique and difficult issue when deter-
mining materiality.149 
Section A of this Part analyzes the standard of materiality that life science 
companies must use to make disclosure decisions.150 Section B discusses how 
federal courts have applied the Supreme Court’s materiality standard to life sci-
ence companies.151 Lastly, Section C synthesizes rationales from federal case law 
to isolate the sources of increased securities litigation in the life science sector.152 
A. Supreme Court Standard for Materiality 
Two decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court establish the framework 
through which life science companies must determine the materiality of a certain 
fact.153 In the first, the Court outlined the appropriate standard to determine ma-
teriality; in the second, the Court applied that test to the life sciences context.154 
Subsequently, lower federal courts have been left to assess materiality in Rule 
10b-5 actions on their own.155 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See William O. Fisher, Key Disclosure Issues for Life Sciences Companies: FDA Product 
Approval, Clinical Test Results, and Government Inspections, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 
115, 126 (2001–2002) (explaining the narrowing application of the safe harbor provisions). 
 147 See 15 U.S.C. 78u-5(b)(2)(D) (excluding application to statements made in connection to an 
initial public offering expressly). 
 148 See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 27 (2011) (denying defendant’s 
motion to dismiss because plaintiffs successfully pled fraud as to a material fact); In re Sanofi Sec. 
Litig., 87 F. Supp. 3d 510, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s Rule 10b-5 action for lack of 
materiality); see also Milner, supra note 1, at 149 (pointing to case law as the only source for inter-
preting the meaning of material within Rule 10b-5). 
 149 See Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 202 (discussing the complex disclosure criteria promulgated 
by the FDA that obfuscates the SEC’s materiality standard for disclosure). 
 150 See infra notes 153–178 and accompanying text. 
 151 See infra notes 179–207 and accompanying text. 
 152 See infra notes 208–220 and accompanying text. 
 153 See Milner, supra note 1, at 149–50 (pointing to the decisions in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. and 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) as providing the only materiality criteria from the Su-
preme Court). 
 154 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 30–31 (applying the materiality analysis to a life 
science company); Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 232 (establishing the materiality inquiry). 
 155 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 30–31 (standing as the last Supreme Court decision to 
address the materiality standard). 
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1. Setting the Foundation for Materiality 
In 1988, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the U.S. Supreme Court solidified the 
now controlling test for materiality.156 The facts establish that for two years a 
company engaged in negotiations to be purchased, during which time they re-
leased three public statements denying any such negotiations.157 In 1978, the 
company agreed to sell all common stock at forty-six dollars per share.158 For-
mer shareholders brought a Rule 10b-5 action against the company for failure to 
disclose the ongoing merger negotiations on which plaintiffs relied when choos-
ing to sell their shares.159 
According to the Court, a material misstatement or omission is made when, 
from the perspective of a reasonable investor, the statements are substantially 
likely to shift the total mix of public investment information.160 This analysis 
calls for an ad hoc inquiry considering the specific facts and context of each 
case.161 Further, the Court expressed concern with creating too low a standard 
for materiality for fear of over-disclosure such that reasonable investment de-
cisions are actually hindered, not informed.162 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 231–32 (stating the materiality test adopted by the Court). The test 
had been previously espoused in Supreme Court precedent, but disagreements between lower courts 
persisted. See id. (resolving a circuit split on when merger negotiations become material under securi-
ties law). 
 157 See id. at 227–30 (providing the factual setting of the dispute). 
 158 See id. at 227–28 (requesting the Stock Exchange halt trading of their shares immediately). 
This date marked the end of the class period, as shares could no longer be traded. Id. 
 159 See id. at 228 (alleging financial loss because plaintiffs would have kept their shares to sell at 
the marked-up merger price). In allowing the class certification, the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory that assumes that plaintiffs relied on the company’s 
material misrepresentation in deciding to buy or sell shares. See id. at 229–30 (specifying that this 
creates a rebuttable presumption for plaintiffs). 
 160 See id. at 231–32 (emphasizing that materiality is determined from a reasonable investor’s 
point of view). Specifically, the Court asked whether there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclo-
sure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly al-
tered the ‘total mix’ of information available.” Id. (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
438, 449 (1976)). 
 161 See id. at 238–40 (indicating materiality is unique for every company based on the circum-
stances). In the context of merger negotiations, for example, the Court stated that the “indicia of inter-
est” in a transaction shows the probability that it may take place, which in turn has an effect on mate-
riality. See id. (pointing to factors such as board actions and negotiations to evidence the indicia of 
interest). Accordingly, the Court dismissed the company’s request to create a bright-line rule for the 
materiality of merger discussions. See id. at 233 (pointing again to the significance of a reasonable 
investor’s perspective that a bright-line rule fails to consider). Such a bright-line rule would take for 
granted the intelligence of investors, who have the statutory right to material information—no matter 
how complex—that could alter their decision to invest. See id. (chastising the Third Circuit’s bright-line 
rule for assuming investors are “nitwits”). 
 162 See id. at 234 (providing rationale for adoption of the totality standard applied to the materiali-
ty inquiry). Over-disclosure of corporate information could flood investors with so much information 
that it is near impossible to decipher. See id. (indicating the Court’s preference to balance interpreta-
tive statements from corporations against the risk of misleading investors). 
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2. Materiality in a Life Sciences Context 
In 2011, in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, the U.S. Supreme Court 
applied its analysis from Basic Inc. to the life sciences context.163 In the case, a 
company received reports that its FDA-approved drug Zicam, a nasal spray ad-
ministered to alleviate cold symptoms, could be causing anosmia.164 Despite 
consistent reports indicating a causal link between Zicam and anosmia over a 
five-year period, the company released highly optimistic projections for the fis-
cal year and failed to disclose being a party to multiple products liability suits 
regarding the drug’s safety.165 Following a report revealing an FDA investigation 
into Zicam, the company issued a press release pointing to the drug’s successful 
clinical trials that showed no causal link between Zicam and anosmia.166 As 
more reports elucidated Zicam’s danger, stock prices fell and plaintiffs filed suit 
for the company’s misleading statements.167 
The company argued that it did not have a duty to report the adverse events 
of anosmia because they were statistically insignificant.168 Accordingly, Zicam’s 
clinical trials returned no proof of a causal link between the drug and adverse 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 30–31 (applying the ad hoc materiality test from 
Basic Inc. to omission of a material fact by a drug company); see also Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 232 
(establishing the test). The Court granted certiorari to clarify whether statistical significance, which is 
often dispositive in the scientific world, is dispositive of materiality under SEC regulation. Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 30–31; see Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 933 (discussing the disconnect 
between scientific and investor standards of materiality that could be resolved by the Supreme Court 
in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.). 
 164 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 31 (defining anosmia as the loss of smell). 
 165 See id. at 33–34 (releasing a Form 10-Q for November 2003 with no mention of the two filed 
lawsuits alleging Zicam had caused plaintiffs’ anosmia). Matrixx’s Form 10-Q was coupled with 
general cautionary language that products liability claims, whether successful or not, could have a 
material effect on the company’s growth by affecting its public reputation. See id. (quoting Matrixx’s 
SEC submission). 
 166 See id. (stating further that clinical trials revealed no instances of anosmia whatsoever). Ma-
trixx’s press release points to the statistical insignificance of any adverse findings in their clinical 
trials. See id. at 34–35 (“The overall incidence of adverse events associated with zinc gluconate was 
extremely low, with no statistically significant difference between the adverse event rates for the 
treated and placebo subsets.” (quoting Press Release, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., Matrixx Initiatives 
Reaffirms Safety of Intranasal Zicam® Cold Remedy (Feb. 2, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1006195/000095015304000327/p68781exv99w1.htm [https://perma.cc/A4HR-2YKL])). 
 167 See id. at 34–35 (relying on the Rule 10b-5 right of action). The plaintiff class for the com-
bined action consisted of nine plaintiffs who had all lost their sense of smell and previously filed four 
individual lawsuits. Id. at 33. 
 168 See id. at 30 (suggesting that reasonable investors would not rely on statistically insignificant 
data because it holds no scientific weight). The dissociation between statistical significance and mate-
riality for dually regulated life science companies was thoroughly discussed preceding the decision in 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 930–33 (exploring the confusion created 
by the separation between scientific standards of significance and SEC standards of materiality). Tra-
ditionally, life science companies operate in a world where statistical significance is the gold standard 
for determining the relevance of information. See id. (noting that courts have refused to adopt statisti-
cal significance as a standard for materiality). 
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events, so they could not be material.169 The Court declined to apply the bright-
line rule, and instead pointed to the methods by which the FDA and medical pro-
fessionals evaluate causation.170 Significantly, because the FDA assesses causa-
tion in a number of ways, reasonable investors are entitled to do the same.171 
Because the overwhelming evidence from prescribing physicians, peer-reviewed 
research, and the adverse reports taken together could have altered a reasonable 
investor’s view of the total mix of available information, the Court denied the 
company’s motion to dismiss.172 
3. Synthesizing the Standard for FDA-Regulated Companies 
Taken together, Basic Inc. and Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. provide the tools for 
life science companies to determine what information is material and thus re-
quires disclosure under SEC regulation.173 Making this assessment requires 
sponsors to consider how a reasonable investor views the total mix of infor-
mation, so they are able to make informed investment decisions.174 The analysis 
is complicated, however, because FDA regulation for approval, labeling, and 
advertising controls a company’s marketability.175 Essentially a life science 
company must predict how the FDA will assess a specific fact to determine that 
fact’s materiality to a reasonable investor.176 As the Court in Matrixx Initiatives, 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 40–42 (calling for a clear-cut rule that statistical in-
significance automatically makes information immaterial). 
 170 See id. at 41–42 (stating that medical professionals and the FDA do not limit their evidence to 
statistical significance). The FDA, for instance, may require labeling changes if any reasonable evi-
dence presents a question of safety, even without proof of causation. See id. (alluding to the reasona-
ble investor’s interest in FDA standards of assessment). 
 171 See id. at 43 (“Given that medical professionals and regulators act on the basis of evidence of 
causation that is not statistically significant, it stands to reason that in certain cases reasonable inves-
tors would as well.”). The FDA can rely on post-approval evidence that only indicates causation. See 
21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2019) (“The labeling shall be revised to include a warning as soon as there is 
reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug; a causal relationship need not 
have been proved.”). 
 172 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 45–46 (pointing to the plethora of evidence that sug-
gested a causal link outside the statistically insignificant adverse events). Significantly, because the 
FDA may have used insignificant data to demand a recall, such insignificant data can alter the total 
mix of information available. See id. at 41–42 (indicating the investor’s deference to the FDA’s 
stance). 
 173 See id. at 40–42 (applying the test to the life sciences context); Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 228–30 
(establishing the materiality test); see also Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 232 (writing about the re-
maining challenge of determining materiality for disclosure purposes). 
 174 See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 228–31 (describing the purpose of the 1934 Act to prohibit the 
fraudulent manipulation of stock prices without the investors’ knowledge). 
 175 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 914 (discussing the FDA’s effect on materiality through 
their control on the marketability of a product). 
 176 See id. (highlighting life science companies’ reliance on FDA regulation to release investor 
communications); see also Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 40–42 (likening materiality to how the 
FDA would determine a causal link between Zicam and anosmia because it would mean recall pursu-
ant to FDA regulation). 
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Inc. conceded, however, the FDA does not rely on a clear-cut test to assesses a 
drug’s safety and efficacy—the key requirements for marketability—but instead 
applies a myriad of tools, strategies, and factors.177 In the highly complex and 
unpredictable life science market, failure to accurately predict the FDA’s con-
clusion on ambiguous assessment factors can easily appear reckless in hind-
sight.178 
B. Identifying the Issue 
The Supreme Court’s rationale in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. purportedly set-
tles the legal assessment of materiality needed to make disclosure decisions, yet 
life science companies continue to defraud investors.179 Since 2012, the number 
of securities suits brought against life science companies has risen dramatical-
ly.180 To elucidate the core issues at the heart of increased securities regulation, 
an analysis of federal cases finding material misstatements since Matrixx Initia-
tives, Inc. is necessary.181 
1. Reliance to Materiality 
In 2017, in Levi v. Atossa Genetics, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit heard a case involving a company that created and sold detection 
devices to predict cancer development.182 The FDA approved one of the compa-
                                                                                                                           
 177 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 41–42 (quoting amorphous FDA assessment standards 
such as “biologic plausibility,” “potential to mitigate the risk in the population,” and the “temporal rela-
tionship of product use and the [adverse] event” of FDA Guidance); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & 
RESEARCH & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUID-
ANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES AND PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGIC 
ASSESSMENT, at 18 (2005), https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/Good-Pharmacovigilance-
Practices-and-Pharmacoepidemiologic-Assessment-March-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5ZW-3VP3] 
(providing a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered when assessing the severity of adverse 
events). 
 178 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 936 (emphasizing how the vast amount of data plaintiffs 
sift through, when looked at with a retrospective lens, can easily yield misstatements of material facts 
that appear reckless). 
 179 See Milner, supra note 1, at 151 (pointing to Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. as the last Supreme Court 
decision on materiality for a life science company); see also KISTENBROKER ET AL., supra note 13, at 
4 (showing the increasing prevalence of life science securities litigation). 
 180 See KISTENBROKER ET AL., supra note 13, at 4 (showing an increase by 225% from 2012 to 
2017). Investors sought recourse for many alleged violations including misrepresentations about 
products during development, falling stock prices after failed clinical trials, optimism towards achiev-
ing FDA approval, and repurposing of FDA-approved products. See id. (exploring the types of securi-
ties claims brought against life science companies in 2017). 
 181 See Milner, supra note 1, at 168–80 (analyzing various federal cases that have addressed the 
materiality standard). 
 182 See Levi v. Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d 784, 790 (9th Cir. 2017) (providing the factual 
background). In general, medical device companies are subject to the same types of FDA and SEC 
regulation as pharmaceutical companies. See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 913 (discussing disclo-
sure regulations for both medical device and pharmaceutical companies as one in the same). 
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ny’s devices, the Mammary Aspirate Specimen Cytology Test System (MASCT 
System), to collect samples from patients, but not as a diagnostic tool to indicate 
the presence of breast cancer.183 The company first presented the MASCT Sys-
tem as an independent collection device, but subsequently joined its marketing 
with a diagnostic device, ForeCYTE, that had not received FDA approval.184 
Language in the company’s initial public offering documents reflected a belief 
that the FDA was not regulating certain types of tests created by complex labora-
tories, such as ForeCYTE.185 In public marketing statements following its IPO, 
the company referred to ForeCYTE as “FDA cleared” and the MASCT System 
as FDA approved following alterations to the device.186 The FDA sent a warning 
letter to the company specifying violations and explicit ramifications.187 In re-
sponse to the warning letter, the company filed a Form 8-K specifically disclos-
ing the FDA’s requirement of new MASCT System approval, but otherwise 
providing only boiler plate descriptions of the letters.188 The company then con-
sistently manifested confidence in the sufficiency of its response to the FDA and 
ability to receive the necessary approvals.189 Seven months after its warning let-
ter, the FDA required the company to recall both the MASCT System and 
ForeCYTE.190 The company did not disclose the recalls for almost three weeks, 
and when it informed investors, the company’s share price dropped by over for-
ty-six percent.191 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d at 790 (describing how the Mammary Aspirate Specimen 
Cytology Test System (MASCT System) received FDA approval through the 510(k) process). Under 
Section 510(k) of the FDCA, a medical device that is functionally the same as an already approved 
device can receive approval through a letter from the FDA. See id. (explaining how Atossa purchased 
the MASCT System in 2009 after it had already received 510(k) approval). The fact that Atossa pur-
chased the System in 2009 raises questions of whether Atossa was fully familiar with the 510(k) pro-
cess and specifics regarding the MASCT System’s approval. See id. (considering Atossa’s decision to 
use MASCT System for non-approved purposes). 
 184 See id. (stating that Atossa would have needed FDA approval for both independent ForeCYTE 
marketing and combined marketing with MASCT System). 
 185 See id. at 790–91 (including Atossa’s recognition that FDA regulation of its products may 
change as the FDA exerts more authority in the field of laboratory-developed tests). 
 186 See id. at 791 (pointing to the FDA’s warning letter that Atossa had marketed the devices in 
such a manner). 
 187 See id. (explaining how the FDA warned that the MASCT System required new 510(k) ap-
proval, that ForeCYTE required independent approval, and that Atossa’s website contained false and 
misleading information about the devices). 
 188 See id. at 791–92 (concealing the FDA’s concerns with ForeCYTE). Companies submit a 
Form 8-K with the SEC when a material event occurs between quarterly and yearly reporting re-
quirements. See Div. of Corp. Fin., supra note 115 (stating that companies must assess materiality 
based on their particular facts and circumstance). 
 189 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d at 792 (pulling from Atossa’s CEO’s statements that indi-
cated FDA clearance had been achieved through clinical trials and manufacturing practices). At this 
time the MASCT System and ForeCYTE were still unapproved yet continually marketed. Id. 
 190 See id. (stating that the FDA recalled the products for marketing without approval). 
 191 See id. at 792–93 (describing how Atossa’s CEO participated in an investing webinar six days 
after the FDA recall where he failed to reveal that fact). 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the company’s mo-
tion to dismiss because plaintiffs sufficiently pled a Rule 10b-5 claim.192 In ana-
lyzing materiality, the court contrasted the specificity of the FDA’s correspond-
ence to the generality of the company’s disclosures to investors, ultimately find-
ing it omitted material facts.193 In particular it appears that statements made in 
the wake of serious FDA correspondence should match the scope and magnitude 
of the FDA’s concerns.194 Further, the court noted the close association between 
materiality and investor reliance, as the degree to which investors relied on the 
information, or lack thereof, in making investment decisions to their detriment 
may alter the materiality of a fact.195 Accordingly, the investors’ direct reliance 
on the company’s false statements supported a finding of materiality, even after 
the FDA publicly disclosed information to the contrary.196 
2. Materiality to Scienter 
In 2016, in In re ARIAD Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Securities Litigation, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed a Rule 10b-5 action 
brought against a bio-pharmaceutical company and members of its executive 
team.197 Starting in 2008, the company began R&D of ponatinib, a drug aimed at 
treating chronic myeloid leukemia.198 Due to the risk posed by the disease, the 
company was able to apply for limited FDA approval of ponatinib before com-
pletion of Phase III clinical trials.199 The FDA rejected the company’s proposed 
label in October 2012, naming concerns of adverse cardiac events and dosage 
                                                                                                                           
 192 See id. at 803 (enumerating the statements sufficiently pled to be misleading as to a material 
fact). 
 193 See id. at 798 (describing how the FDA specified the issues with ForeCYTE’s lack of clear-
ance, but Atossa suspiciously left ForeCYTE out of its Form 8-K submission). 
 194 See id. at 797 (highlighting the imbalance in the FDA’s warning letter and Atossa’s subse-
quent disclosures to investors). In the absence of similarly contrived language, a company’s disclo-
sures effectively tell investors that there is nothing more to worry about. See id. (describing how such 
omissions can be misleading as to a material fact). 
 195 See id. at 795 (“If [the CEO’s] alleged statements contained false information about a subject 
that reasonable investors would consider important, and Plaintiffs relied on those statements, then 
those statements are material.”). The two elements’ association may make a statement materially mis-
leading even when contradictory evidence publicly exists in the investor’s total mix of information. 
See id. (describing how investors directly and reasonably relied on the company’s materially false 
statements even though the FDA warning letter was publicly available). 
 196 See id. (qualifying that this type of materiality would change if plaintiffs had not directly re-
lied on Atossa’s statements). Reliance can be pled in two manners: direct reliance or fraud on the 
market. Id. Fraud on the market postulates investor reliance on the strength of a company’s stock in 
the market. See id. (describing fraud on the market). 
 197 See 842 F.3d 744, 748 (1st Cir. 2016) (naming ARIAD and its CEO, Chief Financial Officer, 
Chief Medical Officer, and Chief Scientific Officer as defendants to the securities action). 
 198 See id. at 748–49 (providing factual underpinnings of the case). 
 199 See id. at 749 (pointing to ARIAD’s ongoing recruitment for Phase III clinical trials while 
applying for limited approval). 
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reductions, but a few months later the FDA granted ponatinib limited approval 
with the condition that a “black box” warning be placed on the label.200 Follow-
ing its limited approval the company expressed belief in ponatinib’s viability, 
even with the black box requirement indicating the FDA’s safety concerns.201 In 
October 2013, the company disclosed that the FDA requested they halt all clini-
cal trials and marketing of ponatinib, leading to a crash in share value and sub-
sequent litigation that the company misled investors as to ponatinib’s likelihood 
of approval.202 
The court addressed the scienter and materiality elements of the company’s 
statements in two different time frames: before and after ponatinib’s limited ap-
proval.203 Plaintiffs failed to establish that the company had actual knowledge of 
ponatinib’s cardiac risk and necessary dosage reduction prior to their October 
2012 meeting with the FDA, meaning the complaint could not, as a matter of 
law, create a strong inference of scienter as to statements made during that 
time.204 One of the company’s statements following the October 2012 meeting, 
on the other hand, was found to mislead investors concerning a material fact.205 
During its analysis, the court noted that materiality shares a strong connection 
with scienter because the materiality of a fact lends weight to an inference that it 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See id. (alluding to the significance of a “black box” warning). A black box warning is used to 
alert consumers to the serious or life-threatening risks posed by a drug. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG AD-
MIN., A GUIDE TO DRUG SAFETY TERMS AT FDA, at 2 (2012), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/for
consumers/consumerupdates/ucm107976.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE9R-VSXS] (indicating the severity 
of a black box warning label and likelihood that it would be considered material to a reasonable inves-
tor). 
 201 See In re ARIAD Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 842 F.3d at 749 (providing no specific instances 
where ARIAD touted confidence in ponatinib). 
 202 See id. (speaking of the FDA’s halt of ponatinib as sudden and unexpected). In the wake of the 
FDA’s halt on clinical trials, ARIAD stocks dropped to $2.20 per share. Id. A halt in clinical trials and 
marketing essentially kills the company’s ability to profit from ponatinib, which naturally leads to a 
negative investor reaction. See id. (alluding to the causal link between the FDA’s halt in marketing 
and drop in share price). 
 203 See id. at 751–54 (breaking the analysis into two large sections). 
 204 See id. at 751 (calling plaintiff’s attempt “fraud in hindsight”). Plaintiffs sought to draw an 
inference of scienter by referencing ARIAD’s Phase II clinical trials with a 2012 report from the Cen-
ter for Drug Evaluation and Research that indicated cardiac risks and dosage reduction. See id. (stating 
that plaintiffs cannot prove that ARIAD knew of the risks and thus finding no duty to disclose them). 
 205 See id. at 752–53 (finding the CEO misled investors by naming pancreatitis, as opposed to 
cardiac events, as the most common adverse event). Because the CEO had actual knowledge that his 
statements were false from the FDA meeting, plaintiffs pled a strong inference of scienter and materi-
ality. See id. (allowing the claim as to this statement to survive defendant’s motion to dismiss). In 
December 2012, a report quoted the company’s management team as expecting “a favorable label” for 
ponatinib while naming pancreatitis as the leading adverse effect of the drug. See id. (noting that the 
CEO affirmed “low rates of cardiovascular issues”). The court specifically points to the CEO’s pan-
creatitis statement, in the wake of contrary knowledge from the FDA meeting, as creating satisfactory 
evidence for both scienter and a material misrepresentation. See id. (citing the CEO’s comment when 
explaining the court’s rationale). 
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was intentionally concealed or misconstrued.206 The court went on to find that 
statements regarding serious adverse events for the company’s top drug would 
clearly be material to a reasonable investor, and subsequently that plaintiffs had 
successfully pled a strong inference of scienter.207 
C. Disclosure Confusion 
ARIAD and Atossa Genetics, Inc. highlight the intricate task that life sci-
ence companies face when determining what information must be disclosed 
now, because it could become material later.208 As the decisions make clear, the 
Rule 10b-5 elements of scienter, materiality, and reliance are closely linked to 
one another.209 Connectivity of these pleading elements creates a self-fulfilling 
loop whereby investor reaction can dictate both materiality and scienter.210 In 
this paradigm, hindsight has the power to create liability where it may not have 
existed otherwise.211 Furthermore, life science companies operate in a notorious-
ly volatile market where some discover a Unicorn drug, but most fail.212 Inves-
tors are typically aware of the sector’s inherent risks and are abnormally willing 
to buy or sell shares at the slightest hint of changing fortunes with the FDA.213 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See id. at 750 (pointing to the common-sense link that “the marginal materiality of an omitted 
fact ‘tends to undercut the argument that defendants acted with the requisite intent . . . in not disclos-
ing’ it” (citing Fire & Police Pension Ass’n of Colo. v. Abiomed, Inc., 778 F.3d 228, 242 (1st Cir. 
2015))). 
 207 See id. at 753 (“[W]e have little difficulty concluding that disclosure of the FDA’s concerns or 
the rate of serious cardiovascular events with respect to ARIAD’s leading product would have altered 
the total mix of information available to investors.”). 
 208 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d at 803 (finding Atossa’s statements to be materially mis-
leading after significant reliance by investors); In re ARIAD Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 842 F.3d at 748 
(rejecting ARIAD’s motion to dismiss in light of its materially misleading statements); see also Cohn 
& Swick, supra note 3, at 936 (highlighting the difficult decisions life science companies must make 
when determining what information will be relevant in the future). 
 209 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d at 795 (explicitly recognizing that reliance on a statement 
contributes to an appearance of materiality); In re ARIAD Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 842 F.3d at 748 
(stating materiality’s connection to scienter). 
 210 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d at 795 (explaining how investors’ market actions made in 
reliance on a statement by a company can determine the materiality inquiry). Materiality in turn can 
be used as evidence of scienter. See In re ARIAD Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 842 F.3d at 748 (showing 
how scienter can be inferred when an obviously material fact is omitted). 
 211 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 936 (pointing to the risk posed by a review of clinical trial 
data conducted to determine liability when the review is done with knowledge of adverse outcomes). 
 212 See id. at 913–14 (describing how the high-risk and high-reward investments in life science 
companies are a result of high failure rates yet high payouts). The term “unicorn,” used to describe 
private tech companies worth over one billion dollars, is a particularly well-suited designation for a 
successfully developed drug that offers a return on its multi-billion-dollar price tag. See Erin Griffith, 
The Next Wave of ‘Unicorn’ Start-Ups, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
02/10/technology/new-wave-unicorn-start-ups.html [https://perma.cc/8UAT-99AF] (using the term 
“unicorn” to describe privately held tech companies worth over one billion dollars). 
 213 See Milner, supra note 1, at 146 (explaining how life science companies must seek high-risk 
investors). 
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Investor hypersensitivity can thus determine the materiality of a life science 
company’s prior disclosure decisions.214 
Although predicting materiality is difficult for life science companies, the 
materiality of ARIAD and Atossa Genetics, Inc. misstatements and omissions are 
clear once the market reacts.215 In both cases, investors were provided mislead-
ing material facts upon which they relied to form investment decisions.216 None-
theless, the companies’ true states of mind remain unclear.217 Requiring plaintiffs 
to only plead a strong inference of recklessness creates liability for life science 
companies that unintentionally misinterpret materiality in one of the most com-
plex, highly regulated sectors.218 FDA-regulated companies operate in a scien-
tific space where reasonable minds may differ, and reckless scientific disagree-
ments could equate to misstatements of material fact under SEC regulations.219 
Consequently the disproportionate number of securities suits has raised alarms in 
the legal field, leading a number of scholars to call for legislative and regulatory 
action.220 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 915 (pointing to practical examples of how hindsight may 
determine a finding of recklessness). 
 215 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d at 803 (holding that the plaintiffs properly pled claims for 
misleading statements of material fact, with regard to Atossa’s statement that ForeCYTE was FDA 
cleared, the CEO’s statement that ForeCYTE had completed the “FDA clearance process,” Atossa’s 
Form 8-K filing that omitted material facts regarding the FDA’s warning letter, and the CEO’s state-
ment that Atossa had satisfied risk related to FDA clearance); In re ARIAD Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 
842 F.3d at 748 (ruling ARIAD made false statements of material fact by pointing to pancreatitis as 
the largest adverse side effect of ponatinib when it was in fact serious cardiac events). 
 216 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.2d at 803 (describing how Atossa’s statements were in clear 
contradiction with the truth); In re ARIAD Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 842 F.3d at 748 (pointing to ARI-
AD’s clearly false statement about ponatinib’s adverse effects). 
 217 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.2d at 803 (declining to delineate whether the company knew, 
or should have known, that their statements were misleading); In re ARIAD Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 
842 F.3d at 748 (finding only that scienter had properly been pled, not whether the violations were 
reckless or intentional). 
 218 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 915 (describing how a recklessness standard weakens the 
heightened pleading requirements implemented by the PSLRA because reasonable scientific interpre-
tation may differ). 
 219 See id. at 913–14 (explaining how experts in the field of medicine often disagree on interpreta-
tions of clinical results and correspondence). Adding to the confusion, experts within the FDA may 
disagree or even change their stance on the viability of a drug. See In re Sanofi Sec. Litig., 87 
F. Supp. 3d 510, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (detailing how the drug Lemtrada received a negative report 
from the FDA advisory committee and was subsequently rejected, only for the FDA to change its 
opinion and approve Lemtrada for certain populations). 
 220 See Alena Allen, Regulating Health & Wealth, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 343–47 (2013) 
(requesting legislative action to reform the structure of the FDA); Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 232 
(asking for interagency cooperation to pass new regulation); Milner, supra note 1, at 182–87 (calling 
for legislative reforms to FDA disclosure restrictions). 
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III. A PILL FOR CHRONIC LITIGATION: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Legal scholars have recognized the existing disclosure problem and called 
for various solutions, but they have failed to isolate the propelling legal nuances 
around which any solution must be centered.221 The FDA’s dispositive effect on 
materiality allows it to inadvertently trigger disclosure requirements under the 
SEC’s regulations, thereby generating the disproportionate securities litigation 
risk for life science companies.222 Due to the interconnectivity of the Rule 10b-5 
pleading elements, unpredictable FDA regulatory action directly influences in-
vestor reaction that then supports findings of materiality and scienter.223 This risk 
is compounded, not caused, by the enormous economic incentives that tip the 
scales towards confidentiality when a company faces equivocal SEC disclosure 
decisions.224 
At the core of this increased litigation is the fact that life science companies 
continue to make disclosure decisions that mislead investors as to material 
facts.225 Nonetheless, it is not clear what the companies’ true states of mind are 
when they decide to release, or not release, misleading statements.226 An analysis 
of the regulatory paradigm and the subsequent litigation brought against life sci-
ence companies yields two possible inferences for scienter: (1) life science com-
panies are actively and knowingly defrauding their investors; or (2) the vast 
complexity and duration of the FDA approval process produces a high chance of 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Allen, supra note 220, at 343–47 (pointing to bloated FDA regulations that require sweep-
ing reforms on disclosure and regulatory purpose); Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 232 (calling for inter-
agency collaboration to unify disclosure of clinical trial results while protecting business interests); 
Milner, supra note 1, at 182–87 (identifying competing disclosure interests between the SEC and 
FDA as the key focus for reforms). 
 222 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 925 (pointing to the FDA’s heavy influence on investor 
reactions); see also Levi v. Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d 784, 803 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining the 
effect of investor reliance on materiality). 
 223 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.2d at 803 (confirming the interconnectivity of the reliance 
and materiality elements); In re ARIAD Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 842 F.3d 744, 748 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(highlighting the relatedness of materiality and scienter). 
 224 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 913–14 (highlighting the volatile life sciences market as a 
deterrent to disclosure); Milner, supra note 1, at 185 (discussing why life science companies have 
battled ferociously against mandatory disclosure of clinical trial data and correspondence). 
 225 See KISTENBROKER ET AL., supra note 13, at 11–16 (analyzing the increasing number of secu-
rities actions brought against life science companies in 2017). 
 226 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.2d at 803 (generating only an inference of scienter); In re 
ARIAD Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 842 F.3d at 748 (finding plaintiffs sufficiently pled a strong inference 
of scienter). 
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unintentional, yet reckless misrepresentation of material facts.227 These different 
conclusions, either fraud or confusion, each call for distinct solutions.228 
Section A of this Part explains why proposals to restructure the FDA and 
completely remove the potential of fraud are too far reaching and impractical.229 
Section B offers a more realistic solution centered on a call for FDA guidance to 
clarify the scope of effective disclosure practices and coalesce relevant infor-
mation to a single location.230 
A. Fraud 
The more radical conclusion, that intentional fraud is rampant in the life 
science industry, calls for more sweeping solutions.231 Legal scholars have iden-
tified legislative reform to the FDA as the ideal remedy for the high rates of 
fraud.232 Such reforms have suggested a complete restructuring of the FDA’s 
role in drug development and broad alterations to the FDA’s ability to disclose 
sponsor information.233 Such restructuring of the FDA would be accompanied by 
significant hurdles, confusion, and consequences.234 A few ambitious proposals 
have been suggested, but they are not plausible under the current regulatory 
structure.235 
                                                                                                                           
 227 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.2d at 803 (finding scienter had been proven because Atossa 
either knowingly or recklessly misled investors as to a material fact); In re ARIAD Pharm., Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 842 F.3d at 748 (allowing the case to commence because ARIAD either acted knowingly or 
recklessly in misleading investors with a misleading material fact). 
 228 See Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 232 (calling for a unified standard of materiality where con-
fusion exists between FDA and SEC standards); Milner, supra note 1, at 182–87 (requesting Congress 
to unify disclosure standards and combat securities fraud by amending the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938). 
 229 See infra notes 231–256 and accompanying text. 
 230 See infra notes 257–272 and accompanying text. 
 231 See Liora Sukhatme, Note, Deterring Fraud: Mandatory Disclosure and the FDA Drug Ap-
proval Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210 (2007) (suggesting life science companies are afforded 
too much discretion and are unable to make disclosure decisions that comply with SEC regulation on 
their own). 
 232 See id. (calling for disclosure unification); see also Allen, supra note 220, at 343–47 (finding a 
need for widespread reform to the agency’s statutory authority); Milner, supra note 1, at 182–87 (con-
cluding that the best solution requires reform of the FDCA). 
 233 See Allen, supra note 220, at 343–47 (insisting on far reaching reforms to the FDA that would 
completely change their regulatory role); Milner, supra note 1, at 182–87 (calling for disclosure re-
form that would remove company control). 
 234 See Milner, supra note 1, at 185–87 (discussing the longstanding obstacles to disclosure re-
form). 
 235 See Allen, supra note 220, at 343–47 (suggesting the FDA cease pre-market regulation and 
shift to a public disclosure role by disclosing safety and efficacy data); Milner, supra note 1, at 182–
87 (suggesting reform to the FDCA that allows the FDA to disclose certain trade secrets and all clini-
cal trial data). 
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1. Proposal 1: Rethinking the FDA’s Role in Drug Development 
One law professor proposed a vast reshuffling of the FDA’s regulatory 
role.236 This proposal suggests that the FDA halt pre-market regulation of clini-
cal trials and instead focus on reviewing clinical trial results and monitoring 
post-approval adverse events.237 Under this scheme the FDA would make public 
and accessible all clinical trial data, thus incentivizing companies to make state-
ments in line with the clinical data and in compliance with SEC regulation.238 
Institutional Review Boards and full disclosure of clinical protocols and results 
would keep sponsors in check ethically in the absence of FDA oversight.239 
This proposal’s broad sweeping changes are unrealistic and still fail to ef-
fectively address the core disclosure issue in the life science sector.240 This mod-
el does not remove the complexity and unpredictability of FDA decision making, 
and it may actually further obscure the process by removing FDA pre-approval 
regulation.241 Investors will continue to press life science companies to speak on 
the likelihood of FDA approval, but companies will no longer be equipped with 
the extensive FDA correspondence explaining the agency’s regulatory con-
cerns.242 Prior to FDA approval the clinical data will not be accessible, leaving 
                                                                                                                           
 236 See Allen, supra note 220, at 343 (calling for a shift from merit-based FDA regulation to that 
of disclosure regulation). Alena Allen, an associate professor at the University of Memphis School of 
Law, focuses on healthcare policy and pharmaceutical regulation. Alena Allen, U. MEM., https://www.
memphis.edu/law/faculty-staff/alena-allen.php [https://perma.cc/KLR9-XA5F]. 
 237 See Allen, supra note 220, at 343 (modeling the agency’s structure prior to 1962, where the 
FDA could simply reject a drug application within sixty days if it were incomplete for failure to justi-
fy an assumption of safety and efficacy). If the FDA did not deny a drug application, it would be ap-
proved automatically, and the sponsor could begin marketing the drug. See id. (allowing companies to 
use the label submitted with the application and market the drug for purposes in the application). Fur-
ther, all approved drugs would have five years to complete Phase IV clinical trials upon which contin-
ued marketing would be predicated. Id. at 344. 
 238 See id. at 345 (indicating the belief that life science companies are actively choosing to violate 
SEC regulation because of heavy handed incentives to keep clinical trial data confidential). 
 239 See id. at 344 (relying on consumer backlash and professional ethics to keep companies in 
check). 
 240 See Milner, supra note 1, at 182 (highlighting the challenge posed by convincing Congress 
and the public to take on such a vast change); see also Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 932 (identify-
ing interpretation of the materiality standard as a significant contributor to the increase in securities 
litigation). 
 241 See Allen, supra note 220, at 343 (maintaining the FDA’s review structure where it addresses 
the safety and efficacy of a drug but removing pre-review communication where the FDA indicates its 
preference on trial design and outcomes). 
 242 See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RE-
SEARCH, supra note 75, at 3 (highlighting the importance of constant communication between drug 
sponsors and the FDA to achieve successful drug approval). Drug sponsors would still model their 
clinical trial designs in a manner most likely to gain FDA approval, but they will be left to interpret 
the proper design and outcomes that the FDA would prefer. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 33, at 669 
(describing how companies already design non-regulated studies with FDA approval in mind and seek 
input from the FDA). If the FDA maintains its decision-making strategies but offers no guidance on 
how they will be implemented, the risk of recklessly misleading investors will increase. See Matrixx 
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the door open for companies to mislead investors by recklessly misinterpreting 
how the FDA will view their application.243 The professor’s proposal may effec-
tively address public health concerns, but it fails to remedy the securities risks 
posed.244 
2. Proposal 2: FDCA Confidentiality Reforms 
A less sweeping proposal to reform FDCA’s disclosure restrictions has 
been offered by another legal scholar.245 This proposal calls on Congress to re-
form § 301(j) of the FDCA to allow the FDA to disclose sponsor trade secrets, 
thus circumventing the restrictions created by the Trade Secrets Act.246 Theoreti-
cally this would allow investors to check safety and efficacy data and determine 
the marketing viability of a drug for themselves.247 This in turn would push 
companies to make statements directly in line with their data and correspond-
ence, thereby deterring fraudulent statements or omissions.248 
Reform allowing the FDA to disclose corporate trade secrets, however, 
would face significant pushback.249 Congress has a long legislative history of 
protecting the confidentiality of trade secrets, and it shows no signs of chang-
ing.250 More importantly, drug sponsors would lose a primary incentive for in-
vesting billions into developing new drugs that ultimately improve public 
health.251 Although stricter intellectual property laws could be enacted, compa-
                                                                                                                           
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 30–31 (2011) (finding an assessment of materiality may 
mirror the FDA’s assessment strategies and citing guidance that explains such factors). 
 243 See Allen, supra note 220, at 345 (contemplating an FDA structure that allows the FDA to 
initially see sponsor information with the submission of an NDA and subsequently make the infor-
mation public). 
 244 See id. (calling for uniform disclosure of clinical trials and the elimination of FDA corre-
spondence, but failing to recognize that SEC regulations may still require life science companies to 
disclose predictions of FDA interaction). 
 245 See Milner, supra note 1, at 182–83 (calling for reform to the FDA that would allow them to 
disclose sponsor information at their discretion). 
 246 See id. at 183 (exempting FDA disclosure of trade secrets under the Trade Secrets Act because 
they would be authorized by law). 
 247 See id. at 184 (discussing how such disclosure would adequately inform investors so that an 
issuer of stock could not mislead them). 
 248 See id. (describing how statements from the company would not shift the total mix of infor-
mation available because investors already have all the information). 
 249 See id. at 185–87 (describing the critiques of broad disclosure reform). 
 250 See id. at 185 (exploring Congress’s unwillingness to adopt disclosure reform for protected 
trade secrets). This is likely due to the strong incentives voiced by the pharmaceutical industry. Id. 
Indeed, Congress has taken bipartisan action to strengthen trade secret protections with the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) that restricts the misuse of trade secrets and offers a remedy in court for 
violations. See id. at 166–67 (mentioning that DTSA does not affect statutory restrictions on disclo-
sure for the FDA). 
 251 See id. at 186 (proposing statutory carve-outs that would allow the FDA to release trade se-
crets even if they offer a competitive advantage). 
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nies would be left with no recourse against infringing competitors in foreign 
markets.252 
Even in the face of the practical consequences of its drastic reforms, the 
proposal falls short of creating a life science sector void of fraud related to clini-
cal data and FDA correspondence as it claims.253 Under the theory of direct reli-
ance, untrue or misleading material disclosures may generate liability even when 
the truth is made public by the FDA.254 But the proposal’s primary deficiency 
lies with its dependence on deterrence that presupposes intentional fraud on the 
part of life science companies.255 Deterrence will have little effect, if any, on 
companies that intend to disclose the appropriate facts but fail because they can-
not effectively predict all aspects of FDA action.256 
B. Recommendation: Comprehensive Materiality Guidance from the FDA 
The conclusion that regulatory confusion and complexity lie at the heart of 
the abnormally high instances of investor fraud in the life science sector allows a 
more conservative solution.257 A remedy focused on regulatory clarity, as op-
posed to reform, would allow the FDA to retain its current structure while theo-
retically reducing securities litigation.258 This realistic, conservative remedy 
                                                                                                                           
 252 See id. at 185 (suggesting that broad counteractions against IP theft overseas would be neces-
sary to balance the consequences to pharmaceutical companies in the United States). Foreign drug 
manufacturers would be able to develop competitive drugs at a fraction of the price by utilizing pub-
licly available clinical data. Id. Such reform could also be subject to a Takings Clause claim under the 
Fifth Amendment if intellectual property rights are denied without just compensation. See Recent Devel-
opments Which May Impact Consumer Access to, and Demand for, Pharmaceuticals: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 115–18 (2001) (state-
ment of Richard F. Kingham) (arguing that just compensation must be provided for the release of 
proprietary trade secrets). 
 253 See Milner, supra note 1, at 184 (concluding that as a result of its proposal, “[d]rug sponsors no 
longer could make misleading statements to investors with regard to clinical trial results . . . or with re-
gard to FDA communications”); see also Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d at 795 (allowing an investor 
suit to proceed on the theory of direct reliance). 
 254 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d at 798–99 (explaining that direct reliance by investors 
renders moot the public disclosure of contradictory information by the FDA). Investors are typically 
not expected to look beyond the information presented. Id. 
 255 See Milner, supra note 1, at 184 (assuming the threat of FDA authority to release clinical trial 
data and FDA correspondence would effectively eliminate securities fraud in the life science sector). 
 256 See id. (concluding that public disclosure would preclude sponsor “temptation not to announce 
or to put a positive spin on trial results or FDA decisions”). The author fails to address how a deter-
rence factor would have any effect on reckless conduct. See id. (taking for granted that the misstate-
ments are purposeful). 
 257 See Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 232 (analyzing the confusing disclosure regulations and 
calling for a unified standard that simultaneously protects investors and company interests). 
 258 See id. (suggesting a combined materiality standard between the FDA and SEC would help to 
combat high litigation rates in the field). 
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must be implemented before broad sweeping reforms that threaten medical in-
novation are considered.259 
The FDA must create comprehensive guidance that establishes and pro-
vides examples of best disclosure practices during the drug approval process.260 
Such guidance would help companies determine how the FDA will respond to a 
fact, which subsequently affects the materiality of that fact.261 Ideally it would 
provide strategies whereby companies could effectively match the scope of their 
disclosure to the severity of FDA criticism and skepticism.262 With the complexi-
ty and breadth of FDA regulation, it could also functionally consolidate and or-
ganize the FDA’s thought process on what information is relevant to disclo-
sure.263 Corporate attorneys could be equipped with internal procedures that al-
low them to cross-reference other guidance particularly applicable to disclosure 
decisions for their clients.264 
This solution serves two primary purposes: (1) it reduces instances of reck-
less misrepresentations or omissions of a material fact; and (2) allows companies 
to retain the choice of disclosure under SEC regulation.265 Companies would not 
be bound to release any particular information, but only be better equipped to 
assess materiality through an FDA lens.266 The incentives driving the life science 
industry would remain intact and no threat would be posed to the viability of 
                                                                                                                           
 259 See PHRMA, 2018 PROFILE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, at 2 (2018), http://
phrma-docs.phrma.org/industryprofile/2018/pdfs/2018_IndustryProfile_Brochure.pdf [https://perma.
cc/J988-958F] (pointing to the ninety billion dollars invested into drug research and development in 
2016). If the life science industry believes that investments in an already risky market could have 
another layer of protection removed, they may reduce investment in exploratory products. See id. 
(stating the pharmaceutical industry’s support for an open market to encourage innovation). 
 260 See Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 232 (demanding regulatory clarity in the face of confusing 
disclosure standards). 
 261 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 924 (confirming the FDA’s effect on market reaction and 
therefore materiality). 
 262 See Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d at 798–99 (pointing to the disparate scope of statements 
made by a company compared to the FDA’s warning letter when allowing a Rule 10b-5 action to 
proceed). 
 263 See Search for FDA Guidance Documents, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/default.htm [https://perma.cc/KQH9-CH28] (listing 2,702 different 
guidance documents). The FDA’s vast reach and expansive publications can make it difficult to find 
which documents are relevant to a company’s field. See id. 
 264 See id. (displaying internal procedures for industry implementation). The FDA could take this 
opportunity to create a road map for documents that are relevant to the SEC’s materiality standard. Id. 
 265 See Cohn & Swick, supra note 3, at 914 (explaining that the lack of clarity surrounding mate-
riality can easily lead to a finding of recklessness). Like securities law, companies would not have an 
affirmative duty to release all material facts. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 44–45 (explain-
ing that companies retain the choice of disclosure under Rule 10b-5 unless such fact is necessary to 
make another material fact not misleading). 
 266 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 41–44 (highlighting the importance of the FDA’s 
assessment of a drug to materiality from a reasonable investor’s point of view). 
2020] Securities Litigation in the Life Sciences Sector 1933 
medical ingenuity.267 Furthermore, the FDA has the capacity to generate effec-
tive guidance in this area because it already has experience assessing materiality 
through collaboration with the SEC and regulations on drug advertising.268 
This proposal could face significant First Amendment challenges if life sci-
ence companies believe the FDA is attempting to regulate investor communica-
tions.269 The FDA would not be regulating speech, however, but only equipping 
companies with the necessary tools to fully comply with the SEC disclosure 
laws already in place.270 Life science companies would still make the decision 
on what information to disclose, but will have a more clear picture of materiality 
as a result of the FDA guidance.271 Further, private litigants and SEC enforce-
ment actions, not the FDA, would ensure the effect of the guidance.272 
CONCLUSION 
The complex and extensive FDA regulations that unpredictably influence 
the SEC disclosure trigger of materiality place life science companies at a 
heightened risk for securities litigation. The FDA approval process is marred by 
unpredictable setbacks and changing circumstances, and the process is ultimate-
ly tasked with assessing whether approving a drug is good for public health. A 
drug’s marketability is unilaterally dictated by the FDA, making it difficult for 
life science companies to discern which facts are material to investors and sub-
sequently must be disclosed. 
                                                                                                                           
 267 See Milner, supra note 1, at 185 (recognizing confidentiality of trade secrets as a driving in-
centive for pharmaceutical investment). 
 268 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2018) (prohibiting omission of material facts in labeling and advertis-
ing). See generally FDA and Other Federal Agencies, in FDA ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 170 (Arthur 
N. Levine ed., 2015) (explaining the coordination between the FDA and SEC). The FDA has estab-
lished internal policies and procedures to report company actions that may violate SEC regulations of 
disclosure. See id. (alluding to the FDA’s ability to conduct an internal materiality assessment). 
 269 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing the right to free speech); Memorandum, U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin., Public Health Interest & First Amendment Considerations Related to Manufacturer 
Communications Regarding Unapproved Uses of Approved or Cleared Medical Products, at 20–21 
(Jan. 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2016-N-1149-0040 [https://perma.cc/
7FV8-KSCY] (discussing challenges to FDA regulation of speech with regard to unapproved medical 
product uses). The FDA relies heavily on its statutory authority to prohibit “unapproved, adulterated, 
or misbranded” products to enforce marketing for unintended uses. See id. at 22 (“[T]he FDA Au-
thorities regulate the introduction of unapproved, adulterated, or misbranded medical products into 
interstate commerce and the speech of firms may be relevant to establishing an element of a violation 
of those provisions.”). 
 270 See Memorandum, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 269, at 22 (discussing how the 
FDA’s direct attempts to regulate speech trigger First Amendment challenges but that its uses of 
speech as an enforcement mechanism do not). 
 271 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 41–44 (signifying the importance of the FDA’s anal-
ysis to a materiality inquiry). 
 272 See id. (highlighting a scenario where FDA action only provides evidence of a violation but 
does not enforce it unilaterally). 
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To combat this issue, the FDA must clarify its decision-making rationale 
through guidance aimed at best disclosure practices. This would not compel life 
science companies to disclose specific information, but merely suggest certain 
disclosure practices related to FDA communications and clinical data. This is the 
only practical solution unless grand changes are made to the FDA’s regulatory 
structure. 
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